When it is Not Logically Necessary for a Necessary Condition of Value to be Valuable by Kowalik, Michael
1 
When it is Not Logically Necessary for a Necessary Condition of 
Value to be Valuable  
 
Michael Kowalik 18.08.2017 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The premise that it is logically necessary for a necessary condition of value to be valuable is 
sometimes used in metaethics in support of the claim that agency, or some constitutive condition of 
agency or action, has value for all agents. I focus on the most recent application of this premise by 
Caroline T. Arruda and argue that the premise is false. Despite this defect the relevant evaluative step 
could still work just in case of agency if an additional condition were satisfied. 
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Introduction 
 
The premise that it is logically necessary for a necessary condition of value to be valuable is 
sometimes used in metaethics in support of the claim that agency, or some constitutive condition of 
agency or action, has value for all agents. I focus on the most recent and most rigorous argument 
defending this premise by Caroline T. Arruda and argue that the premise is false. The present 
argument poses a challenge to the Constructivist branch of metaethics, in the tradition of Alan 
Gewirth and Christine Korsgaard.  
 
To answer the question 'Why care about being an agent?' Arruda (2016, 11) sets out to identify 
hypothetical (agency dependent) reasons that "have the right kind of content" to give us universally 
normative or objective reasons. She submits that there is such a reason: "caring about full-blown 
agency is a condition for engaging in activities that we value". Arruda (2016, 2) defines full-blown 
agency only provisionally, as requiring the following basic capacities: (1) the capacity for sound, 
rational deliberation; (2) the capacity to act autonomously; (3) the capacity for self-control. Since the 
"the issue of the necessary and sufficient conditions for full-blown agency is beyond [the scope of 
Arruda's paper]" I take "full-blown agency" to signify a special kind of agency.  
 
The way I understand the supporting argument is as follows. We all care about some specific 
activities, which need not be the same for all agents, for which the capacities for full-blown agency are 
required. Since the capacities for full-blown agency are a necessary condition of some of the activities 
that we happen to care about we must also care about exercising the capacities for full-blown agency 
as a matter of conceptual necessity.  
 
In her own words:  
 
"...as long as one cares about the activities for which one must be a full-blown agent, one must also 
care about being a full-blown agent. (...) My point is that it is conceptually necessary that if one cares 
about the pursuit of an end for which aiming at full-blown agency is a condition, one cares (non-
instrumentally but nonetheless hypothetically) about being a full-blown agent." (2016, 9) 
 
Arruda (2016, 10) explains the sense of 'to care about' roughly as follows: if we care about something 
then we judge that it would be, all things considered, worse if we had lacked it. I take this to mean 
that to care about exercising something is not merely to exercise it but to value that something: its 
existence, availability or presence.  
 
The logical structure of Arruda's argument can be expressed with the following formula: 
 
for all agents (there is some X that has positive value)  
and (there is Y which is a necessary condition of X) 
therefore (Y has positive value) 
 
Although the same logical structure has been employed by Gewirth1 and Korsgaard2 (who assume it 
to be valid without explicitly arguing in its defence) I will focus on the rigorous argument developed 
by Arruda to show that the general principle expressed above, namely, that it is logically necessary 
for a necessary condition of value to be valuable, is false. I will also consider subject to what 
conditions are general inferences about the value of a condition based on the value of a conditional 
outcome (henceforth, a 'conditional') logically permissible. 
 
 
  
                                           
1 "... every agent implicitly makes evaluative judgements about the goodness of his purposes and 
hence about the necessary goodness of the freedom and well-being that are necessary conditions of 
his acting to achieve his purposes." Gewirth (1978, 48) 
2 "Since you cannot act without reasons and your humanity is a source of your reasons, you must 
value your own humanity if you are to act at all." Korsgaard (1996, 123) 
3 
The Problem 
 
Arruda does not claim that all agents care about all the activities for which one must be a full-blown 
agent. I know for a fact that I not only 'do not care about' but disdain certain activities. Arruda (2016, 
12) acknowledges that "It is possible not to care about activities for which being a full-blown agent is 
a necessary condition", but this fact, she claims, does not undercut universal normative force of 
reasons that obtain from the activities that we do care about. 
 
Let us assume that Arruda's claim is true. Let us then provisionally substitute 'disdain' for 'care about' 
in her declaration and reflect on the result: 
 
'as long as one disdains the activities for which one must be a full-blown agent, one must also disdain 
being a full-blown agent.'  
 
We should be able to combine the two versions, 'to care about' and 'disdain', since both seem 
realistic: 
 
'as long as one cares about or disdains some activities for which one must be a full-blown agent, one 
must also care about or disdain being a full-blown agent.' 
 
But the resulting formulation no longer has any normative force; it is trivial. 
 
It may be objected that substitution of 'disdain' for 'care about' alters the logical structure of the 
problem: a necessary condition must be satisfied for the cared about conditional to be realised, while 
avoiding a necessary condition is not always necessary to prevent the disdained conditional from 
being realised. In other words, it is not always necessary to avoid a specific necessary condition of X 
in order to prevent X, as there may be other necessary conditions and therefore other ways of 
preventing X. For the relevant substitution not to alter the logical structure of the problem, the 
necessary condition of X must also be either a sufficient condition, or the only non-sufficient condition 
that can be practically avoided in order to prevent X. In either case, there must be a single condition 
whose avoidance is a practical, rational or otherwise valued way of preventing the disdained 
conditional outcome. For example, cigarette smoking is not a sufficient condition of smoking-related 
cardiovascular disease but its avoidance is the only practicable way of preventing the disease. 
 
For the present argument to work it is sufficient to show that, for some agents, positive instrumental 
value of a condition does not preclude negative instrumental value of the same condition, provided 
that satisfaction of the relevant condition is necessary for a positive outcome X and its non-
satisfaction is practically necessary to avoid a negative outcome Y. Another way, it must be possible 
for two conditional outcomes that are positive in value to practically depend on the same condition 
being, respectively, necessarily satisfied and necessarily not-satisfied. 
 
It seems logical that if Y is a necessary condition of X and I am committed to X, then I am also 
committed to Y, otherwise my commitment to X would be incomplete and possibly inconsistent. For 
example, if I am committed to safe driving but not to wearing seatbelts or to obeying traffic signals, 
the authorities may argue that I am not in fact committed to safe driving on account of my non-
compliance with the road rules. But this evaluative principle does not always hold true.3 Following 
the outline of my argument presented above, let us consider the case of being committed to the 
positive value of X and Z, where Y is a necessary condition of X and the avoidance of Y is a necessary 
condition of Z. To put it differently, attribution of value to a necessary condition on the basis of value 
of a conditional cannot be accomplished if there are some instances of the conditional that are 
instrumentally opposite in value. For example, smoking tobacco is a necessary condition of smoking-
related cardiovascular disease and a necessary condition of enjoying the smoking experience. If I 
positively value the prevention of cardiovascular disease as well as the enjoyment of smoking then, in 
order to enjoy smoking, I must expose myself to an increased risk of cardiovascular disease and, in 
                                           
3 "...infection makes penicillin valuable, but infection isn't therefore valuable, much less intrinsically 
valuable." (Markovits 2014, 105) 
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order to avoid the increased risk of cardiovascular disease I must forgo the enjoyment of smoking. 
Since the same necessary condition applies to both the positive and the negative outcomes of 
smoking, and the negative outcome cannot be practically avoided any other way, then it is not 
logically necessary to attribute definite instrumental value to smoking just because it has a positively 
valued outcome.4 
 
What made the first example seem uncontroversial is that obeying the road rules is, in every case 
where road rules apply, commonly regarded as a necessary condition of only a positively valued 
outcome: safe driving.  
 
We can modify the formula expressing the logical structure of the evaluative principle to loosely fit 
the second example, for at least some agents, but without altering the conclusion: 
 
for some agents (there is X that has positive value and Z that has negative value)  
and (there is Y which is a necessary condition of X and a sufficient condition of Z) 
therefore (Y has positive value) 
 
The conclusion now does not follow from the premises, since Y has both positive and negative aspects 
and it is unclear which aspect has more weight. 
 
I will conclude this section by formulating the problem in the actual terms of Arruda's argument. The 
capacities for full-blown agency are a necessary condition for acting consistently, which is something 
that is generally positively valued or cared about (commitment to consistency underwrites the 
normative force of Arruda's argument)5, but also a necessary and plausibly sufficient condition for 
some instances of acting intentionally but inconsistently on account of flawed deliberation,6 which is 
something that is valued negatively by the force of Arruda's argument. 
 
We can try to avoid the complex and possibly controversial implications of 'acting intentionally but 
inconsistently' by presenting the second (negative) premise in less abstract terms:  
 
The capacities for full-blown agency are a necessary and sufficient condition of some activities whose 
absence or avoidance we value, for example, activities that result (or are expected to result) in states 
of regret, shame or physical pain.  
 
Paradoxically, I may value something - for example, preservation of the life of another - for which the 
destruction of my own capacities for full-blown agency is practically necessary under some 
unavoidable circumstances, but the same capacities are also necessary to accomplish the necessary 
destruction. We now have realistic but contradictory value-commitments stemming from the 
disputed premise.  
 
Attribution of positive value to full-blown agency on the basis of the positive value of some 
conditional outcome may be frustrated by the negative value of other conditional outcomes that are 
unavoidable for full-blown agents who are committed to positively value the former outcome. 
 
 
The Solution 
 
The most direct solution to the problem would be to show that for all agents, every action intended 
by an agent is valuable to that agent at the time of intending because it is preferred above all other 
actions believed to be possible under the relevant circumstances, irrespective of its negatively valued 
                                           
4 For a similar argument see Kerstein (2001, 37). 
5 "I have shown that if one cares about one’s capacity for agency, then one should (by virtue of 
consistency) care about how one exercises it." (Arruda 2016, 10). 
6 "...‘consistency’ is a requirement of rationality rather than a capacity distinctive of full-blown 
agency" (Arruda 2016, 10) and no real agent is always perfectly consistent. Cf. "it is impossible for an 
agent to be essentially infallible or perfectly rational by nature." (Lavin 2004, 449). 
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consequences. This view, which may be called value-internalism about reasons, is defended by Joseph 
Raz7, but there are also some strong arguments against it.8 
 
If value-internalism about reasons were shown to be true then the evaluative principle employed by 
Arruda could succeed, since the sought after result would no longer be frustrated by possible 
inconsistency of the underwriting value-commitments. But this would not necessarily save Arruda's 
normative conclusion. 
 
If all agents value all of their own intentional actions at the time of intending, because these are the 
preferred actions under the circumstances, and only this kind of valuation counts towards objective 
or universal value of full-blown agency, we must then value equally those actions that are favourable 
to full-blown agency as well as those that are detrimental to it, for example, taking strong painkillers 
or committing suicide, so that our value commitments to full-blown agency are still inconsistent. 
Generalising about the value of a condition based on the value of its conditional fails again.  
 
An additional consequence of formulating the value of conditionals in a flatly positive way is that it 
takes away their normative force. The logical structure collapses to what Setiya (2003, 380) 
described as only acting on my reasons rather than good reasons on which to act, and therefore not 
reasons that are consistently normative. Any normative principle declaring some actions as bad or of 
negative value for the agent at the time of intending would be contradicting a necessary condition of 
its own authority: that all actions are good or valuable for the agent at time of intending. 
 
If normative reasons of the right kind cannot obtain from the activities that we value only 
contingently we could still approach the problem by capitalising on the second-order preference for 
'acting in a particular way' that every agent commits to when acting intentionally, irrespective of 
whether the intended action has positive value for the agent. If to prefer something is to value that 
something then preferring to 'act in a particular way' is to value 'acting in a particular way', which is 
just what it means to be an agent. The second-order value-commitment about acting is therefore also 
a value-commitment about being an agent. Assuming that this approach could be made to work for 
full-blown agency, there still would be nothing to show that agents have normative reasons to be 
agents, let alone full-blown agents, just because they value certain activities for which the capacities 
for full-blown agency are necessary, but only that all agents are implicitly committed to value their 
own agency by intending to act in a particular way, irrespective of the value of the intended act. 
Another way, we value our agency because in acting intentionally we show preference for acting in a 
particular way, not because we value some activities for which agency is necessary. 
 
It seems that the problem discussed here is fatal to Arruda's argument, and by implication to 
Gewirth's and Korsgaard's arguments, which may be too 'thin' to yield any normative force of 
practical consequence. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Arruda's argument hinges on the premise that if we value certain activities for which the capacities 
for full-blown agency are necessary then we must also value the capacities for full-blown agency. I 
have argued that the capacities for full-blown agency are not only a necessary condition of activities 
that we value but also a necessary and plausibly sufficient condition of some activities or states whose 
absence or avoidance we value. It follows from the above premise that if we value the absence or 
avoidance of certain activities or states, and such absence or avoidance can be accomplished only 
through avoidance of exercising the capacities for full-blown agency, then we must also value the 
                                           
7 "...the classical approach, it may be called, can be characterized as holding that the central type of 
human action is intentional action; that intentional action is action for a reason; and that reasons are 
facts in virtue of which those actions are good in some respect and to some degree." (Raz 1999, 22); 
"...having intentions involves belief in the value of what they intend" (Raz 2015, 1); see also (Schueler 
2003, 104) (Gewirth 1978, 48-53) (Nagel 1970, 35) (Anscombe 1957, 75-76).  
8 (Stocker 1979) (Velleman 1992) (Setiya 2003) (Setiya 2007). 
6 
absence or avoidance of the capacities for full-blown agency, therefore a contradiction, therefore the 
premise (insofar as it involves conceptual necessity) is false. 
 
Most explicitly, I may value and desire to preserve the life of another for what the destruction of my 
own capacities for full-blown agency are practically necessary, but the same capacities are also 
necessary to accomplish the necessary destruction. 
 
I have shown that it is possible to defend the controversial premise by committing to the first-order 
thesis that all agents value all of their own intentional actions at the time of intending, or the second-
order thesis that all agents are committed to value 'acting in a particular way' whenever they act 
intentionally, but these remedies come at the cost of, respectively, contradicting or bypassing the 
normative aim of the argument. 
 
Nothing said here purports to question rationality of contingently valuing the capacities for full-
blown agency because one values some activities for which the capacities for full-blown agency are 
necessary. I have argued only that it is not logically necessary to value the capacities for full-blown 
agency just because one values some activities for which the capacities for full-blown agency are 
necessary. Based on the present case-study it is evident that, in general, it is not logically necessary 
for a necessary condition of value to be valuable, although in some cases it may be logically 
permissible to attribute objective value to the condition on the basis of value of the conditional. 
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